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Abstract
We introduce learning in a Brock-Mirman environment and study
the eﬀect of risk generated by the planner’s econometric activity on
optimal consumption and investment. Here, learning introduces two
sources of risk about future payoﬀs: structural uncertainty and un-
certainty from the anticipation of learning. The latter renders control
and learning nonseparable.
We present two sets of results in a learning environment. First,
conditions under which the introduction of learning increases or de-
creases optimal consumption are provided. The eﬀect depends on the
strengths and directions of the two sources of risk, which may pull in
opposite directions. Second, the eﬀects of changes in the mean and
riskiness of the distribution of the signal and initial beliefs on optimal
consumption are studied.
2
1 Introduction
In the early literature on optimal growth, the evolution of output was deter-
ministic, see Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). This was a natural place to
begin the study of optimal growth since growth had already been studied in
a deterministic environment by Ramsey (1928). Brock and Mirman (1972)
introduced uncertainty in outcomes in an optimal growth model, which built
on earlier studies of stochastic positive growth, see Mirman (1972, 1973).
Uncertainty in outcomes is modeled by introducing a random shock in the
production function. Hence, the future is riskier than in the determinis-
tic case since future output is random, aﬀecting optimal consumption and
investment.
There is, however, another aspect of uncertainty that has yet to be studied
in optimal growth: uncertainty about the structure of the economy. Unlike
uncertainty in outcomes, structural uncertainty evolves through learning.
Indeed, the planner becomes an econometrician by gathering and analyzing
data, in order to learn about an unknown parameter, and, thus, to reduce
structural uncertainty. At the same time, the planner also makes consump-
tion and investment decisions. These two functions of the planner are inter-
related.
We introduce learning in a Brock-Mirman environment and study the ef-
fect of risk generated by the planner’s econometric activity on optimal deci-
sions. We extend and combine the literature on learning and risk in a growth
context. Indeed, there is a two-way interaction between decision making and
learning. On the one hand, decision making may have an eﬀect on learning,
which is referred as experimentation.1 On the other hand, learning may have
an eﬀect on decision making, which is due to an increase in risk of future
1Experimentation was initially studied in models in which the only link between periods
is beliefs. See Prescott (1972), Grossman et al. (1977), Easley and Kiefer (1988, 1989),
Kiefer and Nyarko (1989), Balvers and Cosimano (1990), Aghion et al. (1991), Fusselman
and Mirman (1993), Mirman et al. (1993), Treﬂer (1993), Creane (1994), Fishman and
Gandal (1994), Keller and Rady (1999), and Wieland (2000). Experimentation in a model
with capital accumulation has also been studied. See Freixas (1981), Bertocchi and Spagat
(1998), Datta et al. (2002), El-Gamal and Sundaram (1993), Huﬀman and Kiefer (1994),
Beck and Wieland (2002), and Dechert et al. (2007).
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payoﬀs. While the literature on learning has focused on experimentation, we
concentrate on the eﬀect of learning on decision making. In that sense, we
extend the literature on risk to a dynamic learning environment. Previous
literature on risk has focused only on models in which the planner knows the
distributions of stochastic variables.2
We provide two sets of results in the class of optimal stochastic growth
models studied by Mirman and Zilcha (1975), with speciﬁc utility and pro-
duction functions, but general distributions of the production shock and be-
liefs.
First, conditions under which the introduction of learning increases or
decreases optimal consumption are provided. Here, learning introduces two
sources of risk about future payoﬀs: structural uncertainty and uncertainty
from the anticipation of learning. The eﬀect depends on the strengths and
directions of the two sources of risk, which may pull in opposite directions.
On the one hand, the risk generated by structural uncertainty is deter-
mined by the curvature of the mean of the production shock with respect to
the unknown parameter. Speciﬁcally, as structural uncertainty is introduced,
the marginal utility of investment decreases with a concave mean, inducing
more consumption, while the marginal utility of investment increases with
convexity, inducing less consumption. On the other hand, the risk gener-
ated from the anticipation of learning always increases the marginal utility
of investment, leading to a decrease in consumption.
The total eﬀect of learning depends on the strengths and directions of
the two sources of risks. If the mean of the production shock with respect
to the unknown parameter is convex, both types of risk work in the same
direction and consumption decreases. If the mean of the production shock
is concave, both types of risk pull in opposite directions and the eﬀect of
learning depends on the strength of each risk.
Second, we perform a comparative analysis of distributions on the learning
2See Leland (1968), Hahn (1970), Sandmo (1970), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), and
Dre`ze and Modigliani (1972) for a ﬁnite-period analysis. For an inﬁnite-horizon setup, see
Mirman (1971) in a model with a single agent, and Antoniadou et al. (2007) for the case
of a game. Finally, see Huggett (2004) for a detailed review of other issues studied in this
literature.
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planner’s optimal consumption. Speciﬁcally, the eﬀects of changes in the
mean and riskiness of the distributions of the production shock and beliefs
on optimal consumption are studied.
We show that, while a higher mean of the production shock decreases
consumption, a riskier distribution of the production shock has no eﬀect on
consumption. The ﬁrst result is due to the structure of the Mirman-Zilcha
model, i.e., a higher mean of the production shock makes investment more
proﬁtable. The second result follows from the fact that the uncertainty in
outcomes due to the random production shock is determined solely through
its mean in a Mirman-Zilcha model, so the variability of the production shock
does not aﬀect behavior. Hence, in this class of models, the learning planner
reacts to the anticipation of learning, independently of the amount of learning
that takes place.
We also show that more optimistic beliefs decrease consumption if the
mean of the production shock is positively related to the unknown parame-
ter. Indeed, more optimistic beliefs increase the expected marginal utility of
investment, inducing less consumption. Finally, unlike riskier distributions
of the production shock, riskier beliefs aﬀect consumption. A riskier distri-
bution of beliefs leads to an increase in uncertainty through both sources of
risks. The total eﬀect of riskier beliefs depends on the strengths and direc-
tions of these two sources of risk.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce learning in a
general Brock-Mirman environment. In section 3, optimal consumption and
investment are characterized in the class of optimal stochastic growth models
studied by Mirman-Zilcha. In section 4, we study the eﬀect of introducing
learning on optimal policies. In section 5, we perform a comparative analysis
of distributions on the learning planner’s optimal consumption. Section 6
presents some ﬁnal remarks for future research. All proofs are relegated to
the appendix.
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2 Model
Brock-Mirman Environment. Consider an economy in which output is
determined by the production function f(k, η), f1 > 0, f11 < 0, as introduced
in Mirman (1970). Here, k is capital and η is a realization of the random
production shock η˜. The p.d.f of η˜ is φ(η|θ∗) for η ∈ H ⊂ R, which depends
on a parameter θ∗ ∈ Θ ⊂ RN for N ∈ N. The relationship between the
distribution of η˜ and the parameter θ∗ is strictly monotonic.
Each period, a planner divides output y between consumption c and in-
vestment k = y − c. Capital k is used for the production of output yˆ in the
subsequent period, i.e.,
yˆ = f(y − c, η). (1)
The objective is to maximize the expected sum of discounted utilities, where
the discount factor is δ ∈ (0, 1) and the utility function is u(c), u′ > 0, u′′ < 0.
Expectations are taken with respect to the sequence of future production
shocks.
Full Information Planner. We ﬁrst recall the full information growth
model of Brock and Mirman (1972), where the planner faces no structural
uncertainty, i.e., the planner is informed because θ∗ is known. Given θ∗, the
informed planner anticipates the eﬀect of the production shock on future
output. The value function is
VI(y; θ
∗) = max
c∈[0,y]
{
u(c) + δ
∫
H
VI(f(y − c, η); θ∗))φ(η|θ∗)dη
}
, (2)
yielding optimal consumption gI(y; θ
∗).
Learning Planner. We now relax the assumption of no structural un-
certainty. Here, the planner faces structural uncertainty because θ∗ is not
known. Structural uncertainty is characterized by a priori beliefs about θ∗,
expressed as a prior p.d.f. ξ on Θ. That is, the probability that θ∗ ∈ S is∫
S
ξ(θ)dθ for any S ⊂ Θ.
Structural uncertainty leads to learning and, thus, evolves over time. In-
deed, the planner observes η, which yields information, and uses Bayesian
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methods to learn about θ∗. Formally, given ξ and η, the posterior ξˆ(·|η) is
ξˆ(θ|η) = φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)∫
Θ
φ(η|x)ξ(x)dx (3)
for θ ∈ Θ, by Bayes’ Theorem. Bayes’ rule (3) characterizes the learning pro-
cess through the updating of beliefs in light of the information gleaned from
observing η. Observing η directly, allows us to focus on an environment with
learning but no experimentation. Indeed, (3) is independent of consumption.
The learning planner makes consumption and investment decisions, while
learning about θ∗. That is, endowed with initial output and beliefs, consump-
tion and investment are chosen. The production shock η is then realized and
the output, in the subsequent period, is determined from (1). Information is
gleaned from observing η, which, from (3), aﬀects beliefs about θ∗.
A learning planner’s decisions are subject to both (1) and (3). Indeed, the
learning planner anticipates the eﬀect of the production shock on both future
output and posterior beliefs. The value function of the learning planner is
VL(y, ξ) = max
c∈[0,y]
{
u(c) + δ
∫
H
VL
(
f(y − c, η), ξˆ(·|η)
)[∫
Θ
φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dη
}
(4)
subject to (3), yielding optimal consumption gL(y, ξ).
Learning increases the uncertainty of future payoﬀs by introducing two
sources of risk: structural uncertainty and uncertainty from the anticipation
of learning. In other words, there are two distinct components of learning.
The ﬁrst is about beliefs. While the informed planner’s beliefs about
θ∗ are degenerate, the learning planner’s are nondegenerate. There is an
increase in uncertainty of future payoﬀs when knowledge of the distribution
of the production shock, φ(η|θ∗) in (2), is replaced by the expected p.d.f. of
η˜ with respect to beliefs ξ,
∫
Θ
φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)dθ in (4).
The second component concerns anticipation, i.e., learning is anticipated
using Bayesian updating. In a dynamic context, rational expectations imply
that the information contained in the future production shock is anticipated.
Anticipation of learning is integrated into (4) by anticipating the updated
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beliefs from ξ to ξˆ(·|η) using (3).
Nonseparability of Control and Learning. The anticipation of learn-
ing is related to the nonseparability of control and learning since the dynam-
ics given in (1) and (3) are entwined through the production shock. If the
only link between periods were beliefs, i.e., no capital accumulation, then the
anticipation of learning would have no eﬀect on optimization.
Adaptive Learning Planner. In order to study the eﬀect of introduc-
ing learning, we introduce the intermediate case of an adaptive learner.3 As
with the learning planner, the adaptive learning planner does not know θ∗,
and has beliefs about it expressed as a p.d.f ξ on Θ. However, unlike the
learning planner, the adaptive learning planner does not anticipate learning.
Given beliefs, the adaptive learning planner anticipates the eﬀect of the
production shock solely on future output, while beliefs are assumed to re-
main constant in his objective function. Therefore, the value function of the
adaptive learning planner is
VAL(y; ξ) = max
c∈[0,y]
{
u(c) + δ
∫
H
VAL(f(y − c, η); ξ)
[∫
Θ
φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dη
}
,
(5)
yielding optimal consumption gAL(y; ξ). The adaptive learning planner does,
however, update beliefs in each period. Once information arrives, the adap-
tive learning planner adapts and updates beliefs, subject to (3). Therefore,
the adaptive learning planner reacts to new information, but does not antic-
ipate it.
Note that the informed and adaptive learning planners diﬀer solely in the
distribution of the production shock. Indeed, knowledge of the distribution
of the production shock, φ(η|θ∗) in (2), is replaced by the expected p.d.f. of η˜
with respect to beliefs ξ,
∫
Θ
φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)dθ in (5). Thus, the adaptive learning
planner faces a more variable distribution of the production shock than the
informed planner.
Comparisons. While comparing informed and learning planners cap-
tures the overall eﬀect of introducing learning in growth, the introduction
3See Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for a detailed exposition of adaptive learning. See
also Milani (2007).
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of the intermediate case of an adaptive learning planner allows us to study
the beliefs and anticipation components independently. First, comparing (2)
and (5) captures the beliefs component, i.e., the risk generated from not
knowing θ∗. Second, comparing (4) and (5) captures the anticipation com-
ponent, i.e., the risk generated from uncertain posterior beliefs.
Remarks. In general, dynamic programs with learning such as (4) are in-
tractable, i.e., they are not solvable either analytically or numerically, when
there is no separability of control and learning.4 The problem is not only
whether a solution exists, but if a solution can be characterized and its prop-
erties studied. Two aspects of dynamic programming with learning should
be noted.
First, (4) depends on the variable y and the prior p.d.f ξ on Θ. Unless
the space Θ contains a ﬁnite number of elements, the state space (y, ξ) is
inﬁnite-dimensional, leading to the curse of dimensionality.
Second, the evolution of beliefs, according to Bayes’ law, does not pre-
vent the prior and posterior p.d.f.’s ξ and ξˆ(·|η) from belonging to diﬀer-
ent families. This makes the solution of an inﬁnite-horizon dynamic pro-
gramming problem with Bayesian dynamics generally intractable. Indeed,
the learning planner makes consumption and investment decisions, antici-
pating updating beliefs every period. In other words, the value function,
V
(
f(y − c, η), ξˆ(·|η)
)
in (4), encompasses beliefs that have been updated
inﬁnitely many times.
3 Optimal Consumption and Investment
In order to deal with the complexities of learning in growth, we focus on
the class of optimal stochastic growth models studied by Mirman and Zilcha
(1975) with the following assumptions.
Assumption 3.1. The utility function is u(c) = ln c.
Assumption 3.2. The production function is Cobb-Douglas, f(k, η) = kη.
4When there is separability, the dynamic program becomes a standard growth problem,
so that the learning planner is identical to the adaptive learning planner.
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Assumption 3.3. The support of η˜ is H = [0, 1] and η is observable.
Assumptions 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 hold for the remainder of the paper. The
model with log utility, Cobb-Douglas production, and general distributions
of the production shock and beliefs about θ∗ yields closed-form solutions for
optimal consumptions in the cases of full information, adaptive learning, and
learning.
The combination of log utility and Cobb-Douglas production is needed to
obtain a tractable characterization of optimal consumption and investment
in a learning context. The Mirman-Zilcha class of models has three features
that makes the analysis possible.
First, Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 imply that optimal consumption and
investment are linear in output in the full information case. The linearity
property remains under learning, although the fraction of output consumed
now depends on beliefs and evolves with new information.
Second, from Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, the uncertainty in outcomes, i.e.,
the random production shock, enters the optimization problem through its
mean. In other words, the Mirman and Zilcha (1975) class of models displays
certainty equivalence. This feature is exploited in the learning case since the
uncertainty in outcomes is mapped to its mean, implying that the unknown
parameter aﬀects optimal consumption solely through μ(θ) =
∫ 1
0
ηφ(η|θ)dη,
the mean of η˜ given θ ∈ Θ. The relationship between the mean of the produc-
tion shock and the unknown parameter is the key in determining the eﬀect
of learning on the optimal consumption function and comparative analysis.
Third, Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 imply that no assumption is needed on
the production shock, as well as on the distribution of prior beliefs. The
Mirman-Zilcha class of models does away with all the diﬃculties inherent in
Bayesian analysis. In particular, the prior need not belong to the conjugate
family of the distribution of the production shock. In other words, solutions
for optimal consumption and investment are valid for a wide range of priors,
even those that are outside of families of distributions that are closed under
sampling.
We ﬁrst state the optimal consumptions of both the informed and adap-
tive learning planners. We then present and illustrate the optimal consump-
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tion of the learning agent.
Benchmark Models. From Mirman-Zilcha, the optimal consumption
of the informed planner, corresponding to (2), is
gI(y; θ
∗) = (1− δμ(θ∗))y, (6)
while the optimal consumption of the adaptive learning planner, correspond-
ing to (5), is
gAL(y, ξ) =
(
1− δ
∫
Θ
μ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ
)
y. (7)
The presence of structural uncertainty does not aﬀect the optimal consump-
tion function, since the true expectation of η˜, E[η˜|θ∗] = μ(θ∗) in (6), is
replaced by the expectation of η˜ given beliefs, E[η˜|ξ] = ∫
Θ
μ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ in (7).
Learning Planner. In the appendix, we show that the value function
of the learning planner is of the form,
VL(y, ξ) = κ1(ξ) ln y + κ2(ξ), (8)
where κ1(ξ) =
∫
Θ
(1− δμ(θ))−1ξ(θ)dθ and κ2(ξ) depends on ξ.
Proposition 3.4. The optimal consumption of the learning planner is
gL(y, ξ) =
(∫
Θ
ξ(θ)dθ
1− δμ(θ)
)−1
y. (9)
Despite the fact that this class of growth models displays certainty equiv-
alence, certainty equivalence does not imply the separation of control and
learning. Indeed, the anticipation of learning changes the optimal consump-
tion function for the learning planner. The dynamics of optimal consumption
are changed as well. Indeed, a realization of a production shock has two ef-
fects on optimal consumption in the next period. First, the realization aﬀects
future output through the production function. Second, it aﬀects the fraction
of output consumed through Bayesian updating.
We present three examples that show the wide applicability of our model,
not only in terms of distributions, but also in terms of general unknown
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structures. For instance, normal distributions are not needed to get analytic
results. In Example 3.5, the case of learning about two unknown parame-
ters is presented. Example 3.6 deals with a uniform distribution for η˜ with
unknown support. Finally, Example 3.7 illustrates the case in which the
learning planner does not know to which family η˜ belongs, as well as not
knowing the parameters characterizing each family.
Example 3.5. Let η˜ have a beta distribution with unknown parameters θ =
(α, β), and beliefs ξ(α, β), α, β > 0. Then, μ(θ) = α/(α + β) and
gL(y, ξ) =
(∫
R
2
++
ξ(α, β)dαdβ
1− δα/(α + β)
)−1
y. (10)
Example 3.6. Let η˜ have a uniform distribution with unknown support [0, θ],
and beliefs ξ(θ), θ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, μ(θ) = θ/2 and
gL(y, ξ) =
(∫ 1
0
ξ(θ)dθ
1− δθ/2
)−1
y. (11)
Example 3.7. Let Θ = {θ1, θ2}, where θ1 represents a beta distribution with
unknown parameters (α, β), and beliefs ξB(α, β), α, β > 0, while θ2 represents
a truncated normal distribution with support [0, 1], unknown parameters
(m, σ2), and beliefs ξN(m, σ
2), m > 0, σ2 ∈ R++. If 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 is the prior
probability that the production shock is beta distributed, then
gL(y, ρ, ξB, ξN) =
(
ρ
∫
R
2
++
ξB(α, β)dαdβ
1− δμ1(α, β) + (1− ρ)
∫
R++
∫
R
ξN(m, σ
2)dmdσ2
1− δμ2(m, σ2)
)−1
y,
(12)
where μ1(α, β) is the mean of a beta random variable with parameters (α, β)
and μ2(m, σ
2) is the mean of a truncated normal random variable with pa-
rameters (m, σ2).
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4 The Eﬀect of Learning on Optimal Policies
In this section, we study the overall eﬀect of introducing learning through
both its beliefs and anticipation components. Our results extend the litera-
ture on the eﬀect of an increase in risk on optimal consumption and invest-
ment to a learning environment. Previous literature has focused on models
in which the planner knows the distributions of stochastic variables. An
increase in risk of future payoﬀs results in substitution and precautionary
behavior. First, increased risk in investment leads to a substitution from
future consumption to present consumption. Second, increased risk raises
the prospect of low consumption in future, leading to more investment for
precautionary reasons. The eﬀect of risk on consumption depends on the
strengths of these two elements. Formally, the eﬀect depends on the second
derivative of some functions of the random variable being studied.5
In the learning case, the eﬀect of an increase in risk also depends on the
second derivatives of some functions of the appropriate random variable. To
see this, consider the ﬁrst-order conditions of the informed planner,
1
c
=
δR(μ(θ∗))
y − c , (13)
the adaptive learning planner,
1
c
=
δR
(∫
Θ
μ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ
)
y − c , (14)
and the learning planner,
1
c
=
δ
∫
Θ
R(μ(θ))ξ(θ)dθ
y − c . (15)
Here, R(x) = x(1 − δx)−1, R′, R′′ > 0, for x ∈ [0, 1] characterizes the eﬀect
of uncertainty in outcomes due to the random production shock η˜ on the
5Consider a two-period model in which the planner maximizes u(c)+ δE[u (f(y − c, η˜)]
over c. If yˆ = f(y− c) + η, then it is the convexity of the marginal utility of consumption
that leads to precautionary investment. If yˆ = ηf(y − c), then it is the convexity of
ηf ′(y − c)u′(ηf(y − c)) with respect to η that leads to precautionary investment.
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expected marginal utility of investment.
From (13) and (14), structural uncertainty aﬀects the expected marginal
utility of investment. Here, it is the second derivative of the mean of the
production shock, with respect to the unknown parameter, that determines
the eﬀect of an increase in risk due to structural uncertainty.
Moreover, from (14) and (15), the anticipation of learning aﬀects the
expected marginal utility of investment. Here, it is the convexity of R that
determines the eﬀect of an increase in risk due to the anticipation of learning.
Finally, from (13) and (15), the overall eﬀect of learning on optimal con-
sumption is characterized by the expectation of R with respect to beliefs ξ.
Here, it is the second derivative of R with respect to the unknown parameter
that determines the overall eﬀect of introducing learning through both its
beliefs and anticipation components.
The impact of the anticipation component of learning is revealed by com-
paring (14) and (15). Proposition 4.1 states that the anticipation of learning
always decreases optimal consumption. Formally,
Proposition 4.1. gAL(y; ξ) > gL(y, ξ).
Proposition 4.1 is due to the convexity of R, and, thus, the expected
marginal utility of investment, and the use of Jensen’s inequality on the
right-hand sides of (14) and (15). The risk generated from the anticipation
of learning increases the expected marginal utility of investment, leading to
a decrease in consumption or precautionary investment.
Beliefs and Anticipation Components. Next, the eﬀect of intro-
ducing learning in an optimal growth model, when beliefs are unbiased, is
studied. First, we consider beliefs about the mean of the production shock
that are unbiased, i.e., μ(θ∗) =
∫
Θ
μ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ. Second, we focus on beliefs
about the parameter θ∗ that are unbiased, i.e., θ∗ =
∫
Θ
θξ(θ)dθ. In both
cases, conditions are established under which the introduction of learning,
overall and through each of its components, increases or decreases optimal
consumption using (13), (14) and (15). In other words, gI(y; θ
∗), gAL(y; ξ),
and gL(y, ξ) are ordered.
In Proposition 4.2, the eﬀect of learning when beliefs are unbiased about
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the mean of the production shock is studied. From (13) and (14), risk from
structural uncertainty does not change the expected marginal utility of in-
vestment, since the uncertainty in outcomes is characterized only through
its mean. Since the true mean of the production shock and unbiased beliefs
about the true mean of the production shock have the same eﬀect on behav-
ior, there is certainty equivalence. Therefore, the total eﬀect of learning is
due to the anticipation of learning. As established in Proposition 4.1, the risk
generated from the anticipation component increases the expected marginal
utility of investment, leading to precautionary investment. Formally,
Proposition 4.2. Suppose beliefs are unbiased about the mean of the pro-
duction shock, μ(θ∗) =
∫
Θ
μ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ. Then, learning decreases optimal con-
sumption, and gI(y; θ
∗) = gAL(y; ξ) > gL(y, ξ).
In Proposition 4.3, the eﬀect of learning when beliefs are unbiased about
the unknown parameter, θ∗ =
∫
Θ
θξ(θ)dθ, is studied. The eﬀect of learn-
ing in this case is not as simple as in Proposition 4.2. The reason is that
both sources of risk due to learning are at work here. Indeed, the eﬀect of
structural uncertainty depends on the second derivative of the mean of the
production shock with respect to θ. If the mean of the production shock
with respect to θ is concave, then structural uncertainty increases optimal
consumption. In other words, as structural uncertainty is introduced, with
θ∗ replaced by unbiased beliefs about θ∗, the marginal utility of investment
decreases, inducing less investment. And, the marginal utility of investment
increases with convexity, inducing more investment.
This point is illustrated in Example 3.5 in which η˜ has a beta distribution
with parameters α, β > 0 assuming that ρ = 1. If α ≡ θ is unknown and
β is known, then μ′′(θ) = −2β/(θ + β)3 < 0, and structural uncertainty
increases consumption. However, if α is known and β ≡ θ is unknown, then
μ′′(θ) = 2α/(α+ θ)3 > 0, and structural uncertainty decreases consumption.
The total eﬀect depends on the strengths and directions of the beliefs and
anticipation components. If the mean of the production shock with respect
to the parameter is convex, then both types of risk work in the same direction
and optimal consumption decreases. However, if the mean of the production
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shock is concave, then both types of risk pull in opposite directions and the
eﬀect of learning depends on the strength of each risk. Mathematically, it is
the second derivative of R with respect to θ that determines the strength of
the overall eﬀect, i.e.,
d2R
dθ2
=
μ′′(θ)(1− δμ(θ)) + 2δμ′(θ)2
(1− δμ(θ))3 , (16)
for θ ∈ Θ. The sign of (16) is determined by the sign of μ′′ and the relation-
ship μ′′  −2δμ′2/(1− δμ). Formally,
Proposition 4.3. Suppose that beliefs are unbiased about the parameter,
θ∗ =
∫
Θ
θξ(θ)dθ.
1. If μ′′ > 0, then gI(y; θ∗) > gAL(y; ξ) > gL(y, ξ).
2. If μ′′ = 0, then gI(y; θ∗) = gAL(y; ξ) > gL(y, ξ).
3. If −2δμ′2/(1− δμ) < μ′′ < 0, then gL(y, ξ) < gI(y; θ∗) < gAL(y; ξ).
4. If μ′′ = −2δμ′2/(1− δμ), then gL(y, ξ) = gI(y; θ∗) < gAL(y; ξ).
5. If μ′′ < −2δμ′2/(1− δμ), then gI(y; θ∗) < gL(y, ξ) < gAL(y; ξ).
In case 1, the convexity of the mean of the production shock implies
that structural uncertainty decreases consumption, as does the anticipation
component. In other words, the two types of risk work in the same direction.
In case 2, the mean of the production shock is linear in θ, so that structural
uncertainty has no eﬀect on the expected marginal utility of investment.
Here, consumption decreases solely due to the anticipation component. In
case 3, the mean of the production shock is concave. Here, the beliefs and
anticipation components pull in opposite directions. The beliefs component
increases, while the anticipation component, as is always the case, decreases
consumption. But the mean of the production shock is not concave enough
for the beliefs component to be dominant, and the overall eﬀect of learning
is to decrease consumption. Case 4 is a knife-edge case in which beliefs and
anticipation components pull in opposite directions in equal strength. In
16
case 5, the beliefs and anticipation components pull in opposite directions,
but the mean of the production shock is concave enough to overwhelm the
anticipation component. Thus, consumption increases.
5 Comparative Analysis
In this section, the eﬀect of diﬀerent properties of the signal and initial beliefs
on the learning planner’s optimal consumption is studied. Speciﬁcally, we
study the eﬀect of changes in the mean and riskiness of the distribution φ
of the production shock η˜ as well as beliefs ξ about θ∗. The eﬀect of riskier
distributions on optimal consumption has been studied only in stochastic
dynamic models in which the planner knows the distributions of stochastic
variables. This analysis is extended to the learning case.
To facilitate the discussion, let gjL(y, ξ) denote optimal consumption and
μj(θ) =
∫ 1
0
ηφj(η|θ)dη, for the distribution φj . Moreover, let gL(y, ξj) de-
note optimal consumption with respect to ξj, j = 1, 2. Finally, we use the
following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 5.1. The p.d.f. ϕ1 ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the p.d.f.
ϕ2, ϕ1 1 ϕ2, i.e., ϕ1 has a higher mean than ϕ2, if, for every nondecreasing
function λ : R→ R, ∫
R
λ(x)ϕ1(x)dx ≥ ∫
R
λ(x)ϕ2(x)dx.
Deﬁnition 5.2. For any two p.d.f.’s ϕ1 and ϕ2, ϕ1 second-order stochasti-
cally dominates the p.d.f. ϕ2, ϕ1 2 ϕ2, i.e., ϕ1 is less risky than ϕ2, if, for
every concave function λ : R→ R, ∫
R
λ(x)ϕ1(x)dx ≥ ∫
R
λ(x)ϕ2(x)dx.
5.1 Properties of the Signal
Proposition 5.3 shows that a higher mean of the production shock η˜ decreases
consumption.
Proposition 5.3. If φ1 1 φ2, then g1L(y, ξ) ≤ g2L(y, ξ).
From (15), the expected marginal utility of investment is greater under
φ1 than under φ2 for φ1 1 φ2, inducing more investment and less consump-
tion. Here, the planner faces a higher expected production shock for the
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next period, hence current investment is more proﬁtable and, thus, increases
immediately.6
Proposition 5.4 shows that an increase in the riskiness of the distribution
of the production shock η˜ has no eﬀect on consumption.
Proposition 5.4. If φ1 2 φ2, then g1L(y, ξ) = g2L(y, ξ).
From (15), only μ(θ) aﬀects the expected marginal utility of investment.
Hence, in this class of models, the learning agent reacts to the anticipation of
learning, independent of the amount of learning that takes place. Speciﬁcally,
the informativeness of the signal has no eﬀect on decisions. In other words,
certainty equivalence regarding the random production shock continues to
hold in this model with the introduction of learning.
Finally, changes in the mean and riskiness of the distribution of the pro-
duction shock have a dynamic eﬀect on consumption in the subsequent period
through updating beliefs. Indeed, if φ1 1 φ2 or φ1 2 φ2, then ξˆ1 
= ξˆ2, for
the same η. Hence, g1L(yˆ, ξˆ
1) 
= g2L(yˆ, ξˆ2).
5.2 Properties of Prior Beliefs
Proposition 5.5 shows the eﬀect of more optimistic beliefs about θ∗ on con-
sumption. The eﬀect of more optimistic beliefs depends on the ﬁrst derivative
of μ(θ).
Proposition 5.5. Suppose that ξ1 1 ξ2.
1. If μ′ > 0, then gL(y, ξ1) ≤ gL(y, ξ2).
2. If μ′ < 0, then gL(y, ξ1) ≥ gL(y, ξ2).
3. If μ′ = 0, then gL(y, ξ1) = gL(y, ξ2).
6For studies on the eﬀect of news about future productivity shocks on decision making
in dynamic models that do not embed learning in the maximization problem, see the
literature on expectation driven business cycles beginning with Beaudry and Portier (2004,
2006, 2007), but also including Christiano et al. (2006), and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006).
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From (15), if μ′ > 0, then ξ1 1 ξ2 implies that the expected marginal
utility of investment is greater under ξ1 than under ξ2. Here, more opti-
mistic beliefs about the production shock induces more investment and less
consumption.
While, as stated in Proposition 5.4, a riskier distribution of η˜ does not
aﬀect consumption, Proposition 5.6 shows that riskier beliefs about θ∗ do af-
fect consumption. Proposition 5.6 generalizes Proposition 4.3. Recall that in
Proposition 4.3, informed and learning planners are compared by increasing
risk around θ∗. Here, two learning planners, one with riskier beliefs about θ∗
than the other are compared.
As in Proposition 4.3, the eﬀect of a riskier prior on consumption is
determined by the sign of (16). Formally,
Proposition 5.6. Suppose that ξ1 2 ξ2.
1. If μ′′ < −2δμ′2/(1− δμ), then gL(y, ξ1) ≤ gL(y, ξ2).
2. If μ′′ > −2δμ′2/(1− δμ), then gL(y, ξ1) ≥ gL(y, ξ2).
3. If μ′′ = −2δμ′2/(1− δμ), then gL(y, ξ1) = gL(y, ξ2).
The discussion is similar to the one for Proposition 4.3. In case 1, the be-
liefs and anticipation components pull in opposite directions, but the mean of
the production shock is concave enough to overwhelm the anticipation com-
ponent. Thus, as beliefs become riskier, consumption decreases. In case 2,
the anticipation component is dominant, implying that the expected marginal
utility of investment is convex in θ, leading to precautionary investment as
beliefs become riskier. In case 3, both beliefs and anticipation components
pull in opposite directions in equal strength, implying that the expected
marginal utility of investment is linear in θ. There is no reaction to riskier
beliefs.7
Finally, changes in the mean and riskiness of beliefs have a dynamic
eﬀect on consumption in the subsequent period through updating beliefs.
7It is possible to extend Proposition 4.2 by comparing two learning planners, one with
riskier beliefs about μ(θ∗) than the other one. As in Proposition 4.2, consumption always
decreases as beliefs about μ(θ∗) become riskier.
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Indeed, if ξ1 1 ξ2 or ξ1 2 ξ2, then ξˆ1 
= ξˆ2, for the same η. Hence,
gL(yˆ, ξˆ
1) 
= gL(yˆ, ξˆ2).
6 Final Remarks
In this paper, we have studied learning when the shock determines the curva-
ture of the production. Consider an alternative production in which the shock
aﬀects the level, i.e., f(k, η) = ηk. If the utility is u(c) = (1 − 1/γ)−1c1− 1γ ,
γ 
= 1, it can be shown that gL(y, ξ) = κ1(ξ)−γy, where κ1 is implicitly
deﬁned by
κ1(ξ) =
(
1 + δγ
(∫ 1
0
η1−
1
γ κ1
(
ξˆ(·|η)
)[∫
Θ
φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dη
)γ) 1γ
. (17)
While optimal consumption is still linear in output, the distribution of the
shock is no longer characterized by a statistic, such as the mean in Mirman-
Zilcha. Therefore, results with general distribution functions cannot be ob-
tained. Future numerical research on this alternative case will further our
understanding of learning in in diﬀerent economic structures.8
8We thank the Associate Editor for suggesting this alternative.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.4. We conjecture that the value function of the
learning planner is of the form VL(y, ξ) = κ1(ξ) ln y+ κ2(ξ), where κ1 and κ2
depend on ξ. From (4),
VL(y, ξ) = max
c∈(0,y)
{
ln c + δ ln(y − c)
∫ 1
0
κ1
(
ξˆ(·|η)
)
η
[∫
Θ
φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dη
+ δ
∫ 1
0
κ2
(
ξˆ(·|η)
)[∫
Θ
φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dη
}
. (18)
The ﬁrst-order condition is c−1 = δ(y−c)−1 ∫ 1
0
κ1
(
ξˆ(·|η)
)
η
[∫
Θ
φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)dθ] dη,
evaluated at c = gL(y, ξ), so that
gL(y, ξ) =
(
1 + δ
∫ 1
0
κ1
(
ξˆ(·|η)
)
η
[∫
Θ
φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dη
)−1
y. (19)
Plugging (19) into (18) yields
VL(y, ξ) =
(
1 + δ
∫ 1
0
κ1
(
ξˆ(·|η)
)
η
[∫
Θ
φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dη
)
ln y + κ3(ξ),
(20)
≡ κ1(ξ) ln y + κ2(ξ), (21)
where κ3 depends on ξ as well. Therefore,
κ1(ξ) ≡ 1 + δ
∫ 1
0
κ1
(
ξˆ(·|η)
)
η
[∫
Θ
φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dη. (22)
The solution to (22) is
κ1(ξ) =
∫
Θ
ξ(θ)dθ
1− δμ(θ) , (23)
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where μ(θ) =
∫ 1
0
ηφ(η|θ)dη. To verify that (23) is the solution to (22),
updating (23) to the next period yields
κ1
(
ξˆ(·|η)
)
=
∫
Θ
ξˆ(θ|η)dθ
1− δμ(θ) , (24)
=
∫
Θ
1
1− δμ(θ)
φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)∫
Θ
φ(η|x)ξ(x)dxdθ. (25)
Then, plugging (25) into (22) yields (23), verifying the conjecture of the value
function. Combining (22) and (23) yields
gL(y, ξ) =
(
1 + δ
∫ 1
0
κ1
(
ξˆ(·|η)
)
η
[∫
Θ
φ(η|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dη
)−1
y, (26)
= y/κ1(ξ), (27)
=
(∫
Θ
ξ(θ)dθ
1− δμ(θ)
)−1
y. (28)
Since both the utility and production functions are strictly concave in c, (28)
is the unique maximizer corresponding to (18).
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Since R′′(x) = 2δ/(1− δx)3 > 0, the right-
hand side of (14) is less than the right-hand side of (15) for any c, by Jensen’s
inequality. Therefore, gAL(y; ξ) > gL(y, ξ).
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Suppose μ(θ∗) =
∫
Θ
μ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ. First,
gI(y; θ
∗) = gAL(y; ξ) from (13) and (14). Second, gAL(y; ξ) > gL(y, ξ) from
Proposition 4.1. Therefore, gI(y; θ
∗) = gAL(y; ξ) > gL(y, ξ).
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Suppose θ∗ =
∫
Θ
θξ(θ)dθ. First, if μ′′ <
−2δμ′2/(1−δμ), then, for any c, the right-hand side of (13) is greater than the
right-hand side of (15) by Jensen’s inequality. Therefore, gI(y; θ
∗) < gL(y, ξ).
The proofs for μ′′ > −2δμ′2/(1− δμ) and μ′′ = −2δμ′2/(1− δμ) are identical.
Second, if μ′′ < 0, then, for any c, the right-hand side of (13) is greater
than the right-hand side of (14), since μ(θ∗) >
∫
Θ
μ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ by Jensen’s
inequality. Therefore, gI(y; θ
∗) < gAL(y; ξ). The proofs for μ′′ > 0 and μ′′ = 0
are identical. Third, gAL(y; ξ) > gL(y, ξ) from Proposition 4.1. Combining
these three points yields Proposition 4.2.
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Proof of Proposition 5.3. From (9), if φ1 1 φ2, then μ1(θ) =∫ 1
0
ηφ1(η|θ)dη ≥ ∫ 1
0
ηφ2(η|θ)dη = μ2(θ) implying that g1L(y, ξ) ≤ g2L(y, ξ).
Proof of Proposition 5.4. From (9), if φ1 2 φ2, then μ1(θ) =∫ 1
0
ηφ1(η|θ)dη = ∫ 1
0
ηφ2(η|θ)dη = μ2(θ) implying that g1L(y, ξ) = g2L(y, ξ).
Proof of Proposition 5.5. Suppose that ξ1 1 ξ2. If μ′ > 0, then, for
every c, the expected marginal return on investment in (15) is greater under
ξ1 than under ξ2. Therefore, gL(y, ξ
1) ≤ gL(y, ξ2). The proofs for μ′ < 0 and
μ′ = 0 are identical.
Proof of Proposition 5.6. Suppose that ξ1 2 ξ2. If μ′′ < −2δμ′2/(1−
δμ), then, for every c, the expected marginal return on investment in (15) is
greater under ξ1 than under ξ2, by Jensen’s inequality. Therefore, gL(y, ξ
1) ≤
gL(y, ξ
2). The proofs for μ′′ > −2δμ′2/(1 − δμ) and μ′′ = −2δμ′2/(1 − δμ)
are identical.
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